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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
In its ‘Green Paper on the future of VAT’ The Commission has recognized that weaknesses in 
current provisions in the existing EU VAT system renders it vulnerable to VAT fraud.
1
 
Statistics serve as evidence for the existence of a substantial VAT GAP. In 2006, the VAT 
GAP in the EU-25 was estimated at about 106.7 billion euros
2
. The VAT GAP calculation 
includes VAT not paid as a result of legitimate tax avoidance measures, and VAT not paid 
because of fraud and insolvencies.
3
 Consequently, much possible VAT revenue is not 
collected. So naturally Member States are interested in effective safeguard procedures of their 
VAT revenues. Administrative procedural rules that govern the procedure for collection of 
VAT do not exist at the level of EU legislation. Article 273 of the VAT Directive refers to the 
Member States the competence to impose obligations which they deem necessary to ensure 
correct collection of VAT. Consequently, for the purposes of collecting VAT, the Member 
States are free to design their own administrative procedural rules. Because Member States 
are empowered with national procedural autonomy, the domestic procedural law through 
which EU law is exercised differs from one Member state to another.
4
 
Due to the differences in domestic administrative procedural rules, EU VAT rules across the 
EU are enforced differently. This situation creates an additional administrative burden for 
businesses and causes additional risks for unexpected VAT liability, these can, consequently, 
be seen as obstacles for businesses in trying to benefit from the single market.
5
 Additionally, 
there is no unified (EU wide) understanding of what sort of evidence the taxable person must 
provide to safeguard its right to deduct VAT.
6
 Therefore, different approaches are exercised 
across the EU when questions in the VAT sphere arise regarding which information can be 
considered as evidence and how the allocation of the burden of proof is to be done. 
Pursuant to Article 267 of the TFEU, the CoJ has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
concerning the interpretation of EU law with the goal to provide Member State national courts  
with criteria necessary for the interpretation of domestic law in the light of EU law. Therefore 
interpretation of domestic procedural law and the assessment of whether domestic procedural 
law conforms to EU law falls within the competence of national courts.
7
 Despite the 
separation of the competence between CoJ and national courts and the procedural autonomy 
of each Member State the CoJ, in its preliminary rulings, aiming to ensure proper collection 
of VAT, has dealt with the question - when do national procedural laws of Member States 
have to be set aside in the light of EU law and how the burden of proof in VAT disputes is 
allocated between taxable persons and tax authorities. Consequently, the necessity for 
domestic administrative practise and administrative procedural rules to conform to EU law by 
ensuring proper collection of VAT has overall significant importance in the EU. 
                                                          
1 The Commissions Green Paper on the future of VAT Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system. SEC(2010) 
1455 final. p.5. 
2 Estimated VAT gap as of share of theoretical VAT liability varies in the EU-25 between 1% in Luxemburg and 30% in Greece. 
See Reckon LLP, (2009). “Study to quantify and analyse the VAT gap in the EU-25 Member States”, p. 9. [Electronic] 
Available: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/, Download date 07.05.2013. 
3 Reckon LLP, 2009, p. 8, 61-62. 
4 B.Terra and P.Wattel, 2012, “European Tax Law”.(Abridged student edition Sixth edition). Kluwer Law International, p 84 
5 VAT Expert Group 1st meeting (2012). VEG NO 003. B2B supplies of goods – Taxation at destination Shortcomings of the 
current VAT system identified by stakeholders. p 3. 
6 Article 168 of the VAT Directive sets a general rule that a taxable person who uses acquired goods and services for the 
purposes to carry out taxable transactions is entitled to deduct the VAT paid from the VAT due. Additionally to Article 168 
Articles 168 a, 169, 170, 171, 172 of the VAT Directive refer to special circumstances where the right of deduction can be 
exercised or refund of VAT paid could be obtained. 
7 Case C 527/11, Ablessio, para 35. 
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1.2. Purpose 
Since Member States have procedural autonomy to lay down administrative procedural rules 
with the goal to ensure proper collection of VAT, the overall purpose of this thesis is to 
identify the grounds on which domestic administrative practise and domestic administrative 
rules have to be regarded as incompatible with rules and principles common to EU law. 
Specifically, this thesis aims to analyse EU VAT rules and CoJ case law by establishing how 
the burden of proof in VAT disputes is divided. Additionally this thesis intends to define the 
scope of the procedural autonomy of Member States to lay down rules of evidence and rules 
that allocate the burden of proof in the EU VAT system.  
1.3. Research question 
The questions to be answered are: 
1. When do domestic procedural laws of Member States have to be set aside in 
order to ensure proper functioning of the EU VAT system? 
2. To what extend can Member States exercise their procedural autonomy to lay 
down rules of evidence in the EU VAT system? 
3. What is the limitation of the procedural autonomy of Member States allocating 
the burden of proof in the EU VAT system? 
1.4. Method and material 
In general this thesis is based on legal study and applies traditional legal dogmatic method in 
compliance with descriptive and analytical research technique. Materials used are EU 
legislation, CoJ case law, Commission proposals, communications and other material as well 
as scholarly literature. Additional the comparative legal research method is applied, for 
example, by comparing the different methods exercised across EU Member States when 
allocating the burden of proof. The analysis of the different methods of the allocation of the 
burden of proof is based on secondary sources of law. The analysis of Latvia’s approach in 
this matter is based on primary sources of law.   
1.5. Disposition 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the issues discussed in 
this thesis. The second part is devoted to the analysis of the principles of proportionality, 
fiscal neutrality, effectiveness and equivalence, legal certainty and protection of legitimate 
expectations. These principles common to EU law are examined from the perspective of the 
EU VAT system. The third part of this thesis is devoted to ascertain the status of domestic 
administrative procedural laws in the EU VAT system. In this section the thesis suggests the 
answer to the question - when do domestic procedural laws of Member States have to be set 
aside in order to ensure proper functioning of the EU VAT system. The fourth part of this 
thesis analyses EU VAT rules and CoJ case law regarding evidence and allocation of the 
burden of proof. Additionally, an answer is suggested to the questions - to what extend can 
Member States exercise their procedural autonomy to lay down rules of evidence in the EU 
VAT system and what is the limitation of the procedural autonomy of Member States 
allocating the burden of proof in the EU VAT system. The thesis concludes in the fifth 
chapter. 
1.6. Limitation 
In this thesis the CoJ case law and the principles of EU law are analysed through the 
perspective of the EU VAT system. The CoJ conclusions in VAT related cases are not 
6 
 
sufficient enough to define the weight of the scope of the principles of proportionality, 
effectiveness and equivalence, therefore, CoJ case law from other fields of EU law is applied. 
This thesis does not examine whether unified administrative procedural rules are necessary to 
ensure proper collection of VAT. Neither does this thesis examine methods for preventing 
VAT avoidance and evasion. Moreover, does this thesis not discuss how the burden of proof 
is allocated in infringement procedures brought against EU Member States in accordance to 
Articles 258 and 259 of the TFEU and neither does it cover the allocation of the burden of 
proof in criminal proceedings. 
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2. PRINCIPLES OF THE EU VAT SYSTEM 
 
2.1. Background 
EU law sets obligations with which domestic administrative procedural rules in the VAT 
sphere must comply. Article 325 of the TFEU sets a general obligation for the EU and its 
Member States to counter fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests 
of the EU. The Member States must take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the 
financial interests of the EU as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial 
interests. Article 4 (3) of the TEU stipulates that Member States are obliged, for the purpose 
of preventing evasion and proper collection of VAT, to ensure that all legislative and 
administrative measures are effective within its territory. Article 2 of the VAT Directive 
stipulates which transactions across the EU shall be subjected to VAT, and Article 273 of the 
VAT Directive empowers the Member States through the national procedural law to impose 
obligations on a taxable person which they deem to be necessary to ensure the correct 
collection of the VAT and prevent evasion. Moreover, the Member States are obligated to 
ensure that such obligations do not give rise to formalities related to crossing of frontiers and 
that they do not impose additional invoicing obligations above those which are set out in 
Chapter 3 of the VAT Directive.   
Therefore, it is clear that EU law gives broad powers to the Member States to design their 
national law with an aim to ensure that the obligation set out in Article 325 of the TFEU and 
in Article 273 of the VAT Directive is executed efficiently. Due to these wide powers and 
lack of scrutiny in EU law, the principles common to the EU play a pivotal role when the 
interpretation of the conformity of domestic procedural laws with EU law is involved. Some 
of the principles derive from written EU rules, but some of them are introduced and 
developed by CoJ case law. In the literature, the following principles of the EU VAT system 
have been listed: the principle of the common system of VAT, of cooperation, the destination 
principle, the principle of direct applicability/direct effect, of effectiveness, of elimination of 
distortion in competition, of equality, of equal treatment, of equivalence, of fiscal neutrality, 
of free movement of goods, of freedom of competition, of immediate deduction, of legal 
certainty, of liability, of non-discrimination, of people’s participation in the exercise of power, 
of primacy of Community Law, of prohibiting double taxation/tax cumulation, of 
proportionality, of protection of individuals, of protection of legitimate expectations, of 
reciprocity, of respect for the right of the defense, of unequivocal legislation and of VAT 
uniformity.
8
 
For the purpose of the research in this thesis, it is proper to examine the relevant principles of 
EU law which ensure the proper functioning of the VAT system from the perspective of 
domestic administrative practice and its compliance with EU law. In situations when domestic 
administrative procedural law or administrative practice clashes with the principles, the 
relative weight and importance of the principles must be taken in to account,
9
 since they 
supersede the domestic administrative law. The principles of EU law follow in the tier of the 
hierarchy of EU law after the rules stipulated in the TFEU and TEU. The principles can be 
used when the application of the particular articles of the constituent Treaties is involved.
10
 
                                                          
8 B. Terra and J. Kajus, 2011. “A Guide to the European VAT Directive: Introduction to European VAT 2011”, volume 1, IBFD, 
p.42. 
9 A.Zalasinnski, 2007.„Proportionality of Anti-Avoidance and Anti-Abuse Measures in the ECJ's Direct Tax Case Law”, Intertax, 
volume 35, issue 5, Kluwer Law International, p 311. 
10 P.Craig and G. Burca.2011.”EU Law, Text, Cases and Material”.Fifth edition, Oxford University Press, p.109. 
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Therefore, this thesis will examine the principles of the EU VAT system which are more 
frequently used by the CoJ as a basis to render domestic administrative proceedings 
incompatible with EU law. Hence, the following principles of EU law are dealt with 
specifically: the principle of proportionality, the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, 
the principles of legal certainty and the protection of the legitimate expectations and the 
principle common to VAT system–the principle of fiscal neutrality.  
2.2. The principle of proportionality in EU law 
The principle of proportionality is recognized as a general principle of EU law. The principle 
of proportionality, along with the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, is incorporated in 
the TEU. Article 5 (4) of the TEU states that: 
“Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action 
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. 
 
The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of proportionality as laid 
down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.” 
 
Owing to inclusion of the principle of proportionality in the TEU, it can be concluded that this 
principle has a constitutional status. The principal of proportionality plays a vital role in 
balancing public and private sector interests when the application of the EU is involved.
11
 
 
In the Oxford dictionary of Law the principle of the proportionality in EU law is defined as 
follows:  
 
“A principle of European Union law requiring that action taken by the EU does 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives EC Treaty […..] In 
order to be proportionate action, must be appropriate, necessary, and not impose 
an excessive burden on those affected by it […]”12 
 
The principle of proportionality requires that the action undertaken must be proportionate to 
its objectives. Before the principle of proportionality was included in the TEU it was 
developed by the CoJ with inspiration from the legal systems of Germany and France.
13
 The 
CoJ extensively dealt with the principle of proportionality in the case Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, where the CoJ refused to apply German Constitutional law principles, 
but, nevertheless, concluded that the plaintiff could rely on general principles of law if they 
are common to EU law. The CoJ determined that protection of the rights of individuals 
inspired by the Constitutions of the Member States must be ensured by the objectives and 
structure of the EU.
14
 
 
According to T.Tridimas, the principle of proportionality contains two tests;  
- A test of suitability – the means allowed by the measures must be suitable and 
reasonable to achieve its objectives; 
- A test of necessity – entails the weighting of the competing interests. 
                                                          
11 A. Zalasinnski, p 311. 
12 N.Acomb and others, 2009. „Oxford Dictionary of Law”, Seventh edition, Oxford University Press, p.432. 
13 T. Tridimas, 2006. “The General Principles of EU Law”.Second edition, Oxford University Press.p.136. 
14 Case 11/70, InternationaleHandelsgesellschaftmbH, paras 2- 4. 
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Consequently when the principle of proportionality is applied the balancing exercise between 
the objectives pursued by the measure and its adverse effects on individual freedom must be 
taken into account.
15
 
 
In the domestic legislation of Member States the principle of proportionality is not widely 
acknowledged as a constitutional principle. Regardless of that, the principle of proportionality 
is broadly accepted in domestic case law, and frequently it is incorporated in the domestic 
administrative procedure acts of the Member States.
16
 
 
The above mentioned allows the conclusion that the principal of proportionality ensures that 
an individual should not have his freedom of action limited more than necessary for public 
interests. The inclusion of the principle of proportionality in the TEU indicates its importance 
in the hierarchy of EU law. 
 
In its VAT related case law, the CoJ often refers to the principle of proportionality. The 
principle of proportionality can be found in VAT related CoJ case law as early as in the 
Direct Cosmetics case judgment delivered in the January 27, 1988.
17
 In the recent judgment in 
Ablessieo the CoJ referred to the principle of proportionality and reasoned that the actions 
taken by the Member States should be proportionate to the objective of preventing VAT 
evasion.
18
 The CoJ has recognized that prevention of tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an 
objective recognized and encouraged by the VAT Directive.
19
 The legitimate interest of the 
Member States can be regarded as appropriate if the actions taken aim to protect their 
financial interests. Nevertheless, the Member States must act in accordance with the principle 
of proportionality, and the action taken should be the least detrimental to the objectives and 
principles of the EU.
20
 
 
In VAT disputes the proportionality test is often applied in cases which involve VAT fraud. 
The actions taken by the tax authorities when it denies the right to deduct input tax should be 
regarded proportionally before the principle of fiscal neutrality and principle of immediate 
right of deduction can be set aside. The denial of the right of deduction is regarded as 
proportional if,  
- On the basis of objective evidence, it is established that a taxable person is using 
the right to deduct input tax on the abusive or fraudulent ends; 
- The tax administration can prove that a taxable person knew or he had to know 
that another transaction forming part of the chain of supply prior or subsequent to 
the transaction carried out by the taxable person was involved in VAT fraud,
21
 
This procedure is commonly known as the “knowledge test”.22 
 
The knowledge test cannot be applied in such a manner that the taxable person is forced to 
carry out checks of its business partner to ensure that the issuer of the invoice has the capacity 
                                                          
15 T. Tridimas, p.139. 
16 Statskontoret, 2006.“Principles of Good Administration In the Member States of the European Union”. p.24, [Electronic] 
Available:http://www.statskontoret.se/upload/Publikationer/2005/200504.pdf/ Download date 26.05.2013. 
17 Case C-138/86, Direct Cosmetics, para 48. 
18 Case C-527/11, Ablessio, para 34. 
19 Case C-643/11, LVK – 56, paras 61-62;Joined Cases C-80/11 and C-142/11, MahagébenandPéterDávid, para 41. 
20 Case C-525/11, Mednis, paras 31,32. 
21 Case C-642/11, Stroy  trans,paras 47,48; Case C-643/11, LVK – 56, paras 59-60; Case C-324/11,GáborTóth, para 38;Case 
C-285/11, Bonik, para 41; Joined cases C-439/04 and C-440/04, Kittel and Recolta Recycling, para 52. 
22 B. Terra and J. Kajus, p.339 
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of a taxable person, also that he was in possession of the traded goods and was capable to 
supply them and last but not least, that his business partner has fulfilled his obligation to 
declare the transaction and pay VAT.  (See section 4.3.3.3.) 
 
Interim conclusions 
 
It is clear that the principle of proportionality has major significance in EU law, and is 
regularly applied in VAT disputes. On the basis of the principle of proportionality it is 
possible to render national laws and practices incompatible with EU law. Consequently, 
national domestic law must be consistent with this principle.  
 
In VAT related disputes the tax authority of the Member States tend to infringe the principle 
of fiscal neutrality and the principle of immediate right of deduction (see section 2.3.) by 
applying the knowledge test, such actions can be regarded as proportional to EU law because 
the general objective set by the EU is to counter VAT evasion and due to the constitutional 
status of the principle of proportionality, the principle of fiscal neutrality and principle of 
immediate right of deduction can be set aside. Consequently the infringement of the principle 
of fiscal neutrality and principle of immediate right of deduction passes the two-tier test of the 
principle of proportionality, therefore such actions are considered suitable and necessary since 
the main goal in the EU is to ensure proper functioning of the VAT system and it could not 
achievable if the applicability of the principle of fiscal neutrality and principle of immediate 
right of deduction could not be set aside. 
2.3. The principle of fiscal neutrality 
The principle of fiscal neutrality is a principle related to the VAT sphere, and it is regarded as 
the leading principle in this sphere. Since VAT is a general, indirect tax on consumption, 
consequently it is aimed to be fiscally neutral for taxable persons who perform economic 
activities.
23
 The principle of fiscal neutrality has its origin in EU law norms. Similar to the 
principle of the common system of VAT, the roots of the principle of fiscal neutrality can be 
found in the concept of VAT as enshrined in Article 1 of the VAT Directive,
24
 and in the 
fourth recital of the VAT Directive.
25
 Though the origin of the principle of fiscal neutrality is 
to be found in EU law it is developed by the CoJ.
26
 
Fiscal neutrality of VAT is achieved by charging VAT on each stage of the production and 
distribution chain and through exercise of the right of deduction, resulting in the burden of 
VAT being passed on to the final consumer of the service and goods.
27
 Therefore, through 
exercising the right to deduct fiscal neutrality for a taxable person is achieved and VAT 
cumulation and double taxation is prevented. The spirit of the principle of fiscal neutrality is 
that the right to deduct occurs at the beginning of an economic activity, and even in a scenario 
                                                          
23 H. Kogels. 2012. “Making VAT as Neutralas Possible”. EC Tax Reviw, p 230. 
24 Article 1 of the VAT Directive stipulates that: “The principle of the common system of VAT entails the application to goods 
and services of a general tax on consumption exactly proportional to the price of the goods and services, however many 
transactions take place in the production and distribution process before the stage at which the tax is charged. On each 
transaction, VAT, calculated on the price of the goods or services at the rate applicable to such goods or services, shall be 
chargeable after deduction of the amount of VAT borne directly by the various cost components.” 
25 Fourth recital of the VAT Directive stipulates that: “The attainment of the objective of establishing an internal market 
presupposes the application in Member States of legislation on turnover taxes that does not distort conditions of competition or 
hinder the free movement of goods and services. It is therefore necessary to achieve such harmonisation of legislation on 
turnover taxes by means of a system of value added tax (VAT), such as will eliminate, as far as possible, factors which may 
distort conditions of competition, whether at national or Community level”. 
26 M.Ridsdal, 2005.“Abuse of rights, fiscal neutrality and VAT”, EC Tax Review, p.84. 
27 Article 1 of the VAT Directive. See supra note 24. 
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where the economic activity initially intended does not result in any supply of goods or 
service, the right to the deduct is not lost.
28
 Therefore it is important to acknowledge that the 
principle of the fiscal neutrality of VAT precludes limiting the rights of taxable persons to 
deduct input tax paid.
29
 On the other hand the right to exercise this right is limited. The CoJ 
reasoning in the Halifax decision made it clear that the right of deduction must be precluded if 
such a right derives from practise in which the transactions are carried out with the aim to 
obtain tax advantages without any other economic objective.
30
 Eventually it allows the 
conclusion that the principle of fiscal neutrality has a reflection to the principle of the right of 
deduction. 
The application of the principle of fiscal neutrality is aimed at ensuring that all economic 
activities which are subject to VAT are taxed in a wholly neutral way. In situations where 
VAT has been levied lawfully once, the principle of fiscal neutrality precludes levying VAT 
on the same goods or services once more.
31
 Therefore the principle of fiscal neutrality has a 
reflection on the principle of prohibiting double taxation/tax cumulation.  
The principle of fiscal neutrality also precludes that taxable persons carrying out the same 
economic activities are treated differently for the purposes of levying VAT,
32
 unless the 
differentiation is objectively justified.
33
 The principle of fiscal neutrality goes as far as 
precluding the treatment of economically lawful and unlawful transactions differently.
34
 
Exemptions to unlawful transactions can be granted in situations where, owing to special 
characteristics of certain goods and services, competition between the lawful and unlawful 
sector is precluded.
35
 Eventually, it allows the conclusion that the principle of fiscal neutrality 
has a reflection on the principles of equal treatment
36
 and on the principle of elimination of 
distortion in competition, since economic activities in comparable situations must not be 
treated differently. 
Though the principle of fiscal neutrality has been developed by the CoJ, it is a far reaching 
approach and its significance cannot be underestimated. The Vogtländische Straßen- Tief und  
Rohrleitungsbau GmbH  case (hereinafter VSTR) shows that requirements for domestic 
procedural law that derive from the VAT Directive must be set aside, if its compliance goes 
further than necessary to ensure correct collection of the VAT. (See below section 4.2.1.1.). 
Nevertheless, this scenario is limited and can’t be applied in situations where a taxable person 
has intentionally participated in tax fraud.
37
 
Interim conclusions  
The principle of fiscal neutrality plays a crucial role in ensuring the proper functioning of the 
VAT system. It does not have constitutional status in the EU, but the effect of this principle is 
similar. The principle of fiscal neutrality has a reflection on other key principles of the VAT 
system, and it includes in itself five principles common to the VAT system: the principle of 
the common system of VAT; the principle of right to immediate deduction; the principle of 
                                                          
28 O.Henkow, 2008.“Neutrality of VAT for taxable persons: a new approach in European VAT?”. EC Tax Reviw, p 234. 
29 Case C-496/11, Portugal Telecom SGPS SA, para 35. 
30 Case C-255/02, Halifax and Others, paras 74, 75, 85. 
31 Case C-155/01, Cookies World, para  60. 
32 Case C - 33/11, A, paras 32,48. 
33 Case C-549/11, Orfey Balgaria, para 33. 
34 Case C-349/96, Card Protection Plan Ltd (CPP), para 33. 
35 Joined cases C-439/04 and C-440/04, Kittel and Recolta Recycling, para 50.  
36 Case C-643/11, LVK – 56, paras 55. 
37 Case C - 587/10 VogtländischeStraßen-, Tief- und Rohrleitungsbau GmbH Rodewisch (VSTR), para  44. 
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equal treatment, the principle of elimination of distortion in competition and the principle of 
prohibiting double taxation/tax. Consequently, the principle of fiscal neutrality together taken 
with the principle of proportionality allows for the definition of what sort of domestic 
administrative law and administrative practises can be regarded as being in conformity with 
EU law and VAT system.  
2.4. The principle of effectiveness and equivalence 
The principle of effectiveness has been developed by the CoJ and is recognized as a general 
principle of EU law.
38
 The principle of equivalence stipulates that domestic procedural law 
governing actions that safeguard the rights of individuals which derive from EU law must be 
no less favourable than the law governing similar domestic actions.
39
 The principle of 
effectiveness can be looked upon as an expression of the principle of equal treatment.
40
 The 
principle of effectiveness ensures that domestic law does not render EU law functionally 
ineffective.
41
 It is equally important to acknowledge that the principle of effectiveness is 
exercised in situations where EU law is open to interpretation. Priority must be given to the 
interpretation that ensures that EU law maintains its effectiveness.
42
 
The principle of effectiveness is seen as an expression of the generally accepted right to an 
effective judicial remedy.
43
 The existence of the principle effectiveness and consequently the 
right to an effective judicial remedy is found in Article 19 (1) of the TEU:  
“[…] Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection in the fields covered by Union law.” 
Because of an effective judicial remedy, the individual has the right to compensation in 
situations when a Member State has infringed EU law and caused damages to the individual. 
Compensation can be granted if the breached EU law confers rights to individual, the breach 
is sufficiently serious and a direct link can be established between the breach of EU law and 
the loss suffered by the individual.
44
 The requirements which should be met before 
compensation for damages suffered can be granted have been developed by the CoJ in the 
Brasserie du pêcheur and Dillenkofer case.45 Equally important is it to ascertain that the right 
for effective judicial remedy can be exercised if EU law is breached by Member State 
national courts.
46
 
In the VAT sphere, the principle of effectiveness from the perspective of the effective judicial 
remedy has been applied by the CoJ in Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken case. The CoJ ruled that 
the principle of effectiveness ensures that Member States are not allowed to make it 
impossible or excessively difficult for a taxable person to seek reimbursement of unduly paid 
VAT. The CoJ concluded that, considering the absence of EU law which would regulate the 
repayment of unduly paid VAT, this matter falls within the national procedural autonomy of 
each Member State, and that the principle of effectiveness is not breached if the right to seek 
                                                          
38 T. Tridimas, p.6. 
39 Advocate General Sharpston opinion in Case C-663/11, Scandic Distilleries SA, para 46. 
40 M. Dougan, 2004. „National Remedies Before the Court of Justice: Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation (Modern 
Studies in European Law)”, Oxford University Press, p.53. 
41 Case C-591/10, Littlewoods Retail Ltd, para 28. 
42 Case C-437/97, EKW and Wein& Co.,para 41. 
43 B. Terra and J. Kajus, p.43.   
44 A.Eijsden, J. Dam, 2010. „The Impact of European Law on Domestic Procedural Tax Law: Wrongfully Underestimated?” EC 
Tax Review. p. 201. 
45 Case C-46/93, Brasserie du pêcheur, para 74; Case C-178/94, Dillenkofer, paras 21,27. 
46 Case C-224/01, Köbler, para 34. 
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reimbursement can be exercised only via civil law action.
47
 In the VAT sphere, the principle 
of effectiveness is extensively applied by the CoJ in cases related to national time limits by 
which the right of deduction of input tax is limited in time
48
 (See section 3.1.). Additionally, 
the principle of effectiveness in the VAT sphere was applied by the CoJ in the Halifax case, 
when the CoJ concluded that the national court must apply national rules of evidence in such 
a manner that the effectiveness of EU law is not undermined.
49
  
The principle of effectiveness, taken together with the principle of subsidiarity, requires that 
all domestic authorities and inter alia tax administrations must apply EU law as if it was 
national law. The principle of effectiveness does not go as far as to oblige national courts to 
apply EU law on its own motion if such action would extend the scope of dispute.
50
 
Interim conclusions 
The principles of effectiveness and equivalence have a pivotal role when there is a need of 
interpretation of domestic law in the light of EU law. Furthermore the principle of 
effectiveness ensures that the rights of a taxable person which stem from EU law are not 
negatively affected.  It can be concluded that the principle of effectiveness and equivalence 
allows the rendering of domestic laws of the Member States as incompatible with EU law if 
they either make EU law ineffective or are excessively difficult to exercise. Therefore, on the 
basis of the principle of effectiveness, efficient protection of EU law can be safeguarded. 
2.5. The principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations 
The principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations forms a part of the 
EU order and must be respected by EU institutions and Member States when they exercise 
powers conferred on them by EU law.
51
 The principle of protection of legitimate expectation 
is a corollary of the principle of legal certainty.
52
 The principle of legal certainty ensures that 
an individual can rely on EU legislation and be certain that its application will be predictable. 
Individuals must be able to sufficiently and precisely predict the extent of the obligations 
which EU law imposes on them.
53
 
The principle of protection of legitimate expectation requires public authorities to exercise 
their powers in a way that individuals can be certain that the authority will act in a way that is 
compatible with EU law and that by such action EU law will not be affected.
54
 The principle 
of protection of legitimate expectation is linked with the concept of good faith and requires 
that individuals be able to rely on actions taken by authorities which require the individual to 
exercise certain operations. Consequently, the authority cannot later depart from their 
previous actions if it causes a loss to the individuals.
55
 In the VAT sphere the CoJ applied the 
principle of protection of legitimate expectation from the perspective of good faith in the 
Elmeka case, the CoJ argued that national tax authorities are obliged to respect the principle 
of protection of legitimate expectations if actions taken by the tax authorities give a prudent 
                                                          
47 Case C-35/05, Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, paras 37, 39, 42. 
48 Joined Cases C-95/07 and C-96/07, Ecotrade, paras 48, 54; Case C-291/03, MyTravel plc, paras 17,18; C-62/00, Case, Marks 
& Spencer, para 34.  
49 Case C-255/02, Halifax and Others, para 76. 
50 B.Terra and P.Wattel, p 90 - 91. 
51 Advocate General Mazák opinion in Case C-427/10, Banca Antoniana Popolare Veneta,para 28. 
52 B. Terra and J. Kajus, p.43.   
53 Case C-395/11, BLV Wohn - und Gewerbebau, para  47. 
54 T. Tridimas, p. 252. 
55 D. Chalmers, G.Davies and G. Monti. 2010. „European Union Law”, Second edition, Cambridge University Press, p.412. 
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taxable person a reasonable set of expectations.
56
 Equally important is it to acknowledge that 
the necessity to ensure legal certainty is recognised by the CoJ as a goal pursued by the 
system of VAT.
57
 
Furthermore it is important to acknowledge that the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations precludes legislative amendments which retroactively deprive taxable persons 
rights enjoyed from an earlier legislation.
58
 (See section 3.1.1.). 
The principle of protection of legitimate expectations is not absolute and it has its limitations. 
It cannot be applied in situations where an individual acts in bad faith or when the 
transactions involved are related to VAT fraud. This limitation is set with the purpose to 
ensure proper functioning of the EU VAT system.
59
 Consequently, the principles of legal 
certainty and protection of legitimate expectations are not obsolete and can be outweighed by 
the principle of legality.
60
 
Interim conclusions 
The principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations, as with the 
principle of effectiveness and equivalence, serve as means to establish the grounds on which 
administrative procedural norms and administrative practice in the Member States can be 
regarded as incompatible with EU law. Consequently, in the VAT sphere principles of legal 
certainty and protection of legitimate expectations aim to ensures that taxable persons can be 
sure that they will receive tax treatment as expected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Joined Cases C-181/04 to C-183/04, Elmeka, paras 32, 35. 
57 Case C-104/12, Becker, para 23. 
58 Case C-107/10, Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 AD, paras 29,38,39. 
59 Opinion of Advocate General  Cruz Villalón in Case C-587/10, VogtländischeStraßen-, Tief- und Rohrleitungsbau GmbH 
Rodewisch (VSTR), para 61. 
60 U.Bernizt, J. Nergelius, C.Cardner and X. Groussot. 2008. “General principles of EC law in a process of development reports 
from a conference in Stockholm, 23-24 March 2007, organised by the Swedish Network for European Legal Studies”. Kluwer 
Law International, p 58. 
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3. DOMESTIC PROCEDURAL LAWS AND VAT DISPUTES IN THE COJ 
3.1. National time limits and recovery of unduly paid VAT 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is appropriate to examine how the CoJ deals with national 
procedural law norms that render EU law ineffective or make it difficult to exercise the rights 
provided to an individual in EU. In the VAT sphere the CoJ has interpreted domestic 
administrative rules which created time limits for recovery of VAT in situations where a 
taxable person has unduly overpaid it. Before a conclusion can be reached regarding how the 
burden of proof must be allocated in VAT disputes in the EU, it is important to examine CoJ 
decisions from this kind of case line. It is equally important to acknowledge that the VAT 
Directive does not set time limits for Member States in what time overpaid VAT should be 
reimbursed to a taxable person. Similarly, the VAT Directive does not directly stipulate how 
the burden of proof should be arrived at. Consequently situations where a dispute between a 
taxable person and tax administration involves legality of time limits set for recovery of 
unduly paid VAT the issues are similar to those in situations when the dispute involves the 
question how the allocation of the burden of proof should be done between a taxable person 
and tax administration. 
3.1.1. Case C-62/00 - Marks &Spencer I 
The Marks & Spenser I case dealt with domestic legislation which retroactively shortened a 
limitation period for repayment of unduly paid VAT. The CoJ applied the principles of 
effectiveness and protection of the legitimate expectations with the aim to establish the 
compatibility of domestic procedural law with EU law. 
Marks & Spencer, which is a retailer, sold gift vouchers at a price lower than their face value. 
Afterwards, the vouchers were sold and they were given away to third parties. In December 
1990 Marks & Spencer informed their tax administration, maintaining that they should 
account for VAT not on the face value of the vouchers but on the amounts which they 
received when they sold them. Consequently, due to the fact that Marks & Spencer initially 
applied VAT incorrectly, they claimed repayment of VAT which they had overpaid. On 18
th
 
July 1996 three-year limitation period came into force, which restricted the time period within 
which repayment of VAT unduly paid can be reclaimed. Therefore, the tax administration 
repaid only part of the VAT unduly paid respecting the period which was not affected by the 
introduction of the force of the three-year limitation period. Marks & Spencer contested the 
tax administration’s decision. In the litigation process the national court considered that the 
dispute concerned interpretation of EU law and, therefore, referred preliminary questions to 
the CoJ. In the preliminary questions, the court essentially asked whether legislation which 
removed, with retrospective effect, the right under the national law to reclaim unduly paid 
VAT, more than three years before the claim was made, are in conformity with the principle 
of effectiveness and the principle of protection of legitimate expectations?
61
 
In the first part of the ruling the CoJ emphasized the principle of effectiveness. The CoJ 
argued that in the absence of EU rules which would regulate the repayment of national 
charges wrongly levied, such task lies on the domestic legal system of each Member State. 
Nevertheless, those domestic procedural law norms, which govern actions for safeguarding 
                                                          
61 Case C-62/00, Marks &Spencer, paras 12-21. 
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the rights of an individual derive from Community Law and must be in conformity with the 
principle of equivalence and with the principle of effectiveness.
62
 
The CoJ argued that the three-year limitation period set for recovery of unduly paid VAT by 
itself does not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the rights 
conferred by EU law and, therefore, it does not infringe the interests of legal certainty. The 
time set for application of the recovery of VAT unduly paid must be sufficient to ensure that 
the right for repayment could be exercised effectively. The legislation, which is not 
retrospective in scope, complies with this condition. In the dispute the given conditions were 
not secured, since the reduction in the United Kingdom of the time limits from six years to 
three years had an immediate effect on all claims made after the date of enactment of the 
legislation. As a result, such legislation is incompatible with the principle of effectiveness. 
The fact that the time limits which set restrictions in time for the recovery of VAT unduly 
paid is by itself compatible with the standards of EU law, does not mean that new time limits 
do not have to be reasonable and implemented with transitional arrangements, which would 
ensure an adequate time period after the enactment of the legislation for lodging claims for 
repayment which persons were entitled to submit under the original legislation.
63
 
The second part of this judgement concerns the application of the principle of the protection 
of legitimate expectations. The government of the United Kingdom argued that the principle 
of the protection of legitimate expectations is not relevant in this dispute, since the 
determination of the administrative procedural rules governing the claims of unduly paid 
VAT is entirely a matter of the domestic law subjected only to observance of the principles of 
the EU of equivalence and effectiveness. The CoJ did not agree with this argumentation and 
ruled that the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations forms a part of the EU 
legal order and must be observed by the Member States when they exercise the powers 
conferred on them by the EU directives. Subsequently, the CoJ concluded that a legislative 
amendment which retroactively deprives a taxable person of a right to a deduction that he has 
derived from EU law is incompatible with the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations.
64
 
Interim conclusions  
From the Marks & Spencer I case, it can be concluded that the authority to evaluate the 
compatibility of domestic administrative procedural law norms of the Member States with the 
principles of EU law lies in the competence of the CoJ. Domestic administrative procedural 
law does not exclusively belong to the realm of the competence of a Member State if it 
renders rights which derive from EU law difficult or impossible to exercise. Consequently, 
domestic administrative procedural law norms can be regarded as incompatible with EU law 
if they do not comply with the principles of the effectiveness and equivalence, and the 
principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations. 
3.2. CFREU and domestic procedural law 
Marks & Spencer I case makes it clear that domestic legal systems should be able to ensure 
that an individual is able to enjoy rights which derive from EU law. Article 6 of the TEU 
specifies that the EU recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the CFREU, and 
                                                          
62 Case C-62/00, Marks &Spencer, para 34. 
63 Case C-62/00, Marks &Spencer, paras 36, 38. 
64 Case C-62/00, Marks &Spencer, paras 43 - 46. 
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the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECMR. Such protection, as exercised, derives from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. Pursuant to Article 6 of the TEU, 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECMR are regarded as general principles of EU law. 
Article 51 of the CFREU governs the application of the CFREU, and pursuant to it, 
fundamental rights enshrined in the CFREU are addressed to all institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the EU and to the Member States when they are implementing EU law.   
3.2.1. Case C-617/10 – Åkerberg Fransson 
The Åkerberg Fransson case involved interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle in EU law. 
This principle is enshrined in Article 50 of the CFREU and it provides the right for an 
individual not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal 
offence. 
Åkerberg Fransson was accused of having provided falsified information in his tax returns. 
Due to this, the treasury lost revenue which included income tax and VAT. 
Åkerberg  Fransson was also accused of making false employer declarations of income tax 
contributions. The Public Prosecutor’s Office considered the tax offences as serious since 
they were related to large amounts of unpaid tax. Thus, such conduct formed a part of 
criminal activity committed systematically on a large scale. On the same basis which led to 
criminal proceedings against Åkerberg Fransson, in the framework of administrative 
proceedings, the tax authorities ordered him to pay a tax surcharge. Åkerberg Fransson did 
not challenge the decision of the tax administration.
65
 
The referring court, in preliminary questions, essentially asked whether in the situation 
against Åkerberg Fransson, where two processes were brought (administrative process and 
criminal process) - does it breach the principle of ne bis in idem if both proceedings were 
based on the same conduct – falsification of information? The CoJ reasoned that pursuant to 
51 (1) of the CFREU, Member States, when they implement EU law, must take into account 
the requirements of the fundamental rights enshrined in the CFREU. Therefore, domestic 
legislative acts must be in conformity with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the CFREU. 
Under Articles 2, 250 (1) and 273 of the VAT Directive, the Member States are obliged to 
take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the 
VAT due within its territory and for preventing evasion. Article 325 of the TFEU obliges the 
Member States to counter illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the EU. Article 4 
(3) of the TEU stipulates that a Member State is obliged, for purposes of preventing evasion, 
to provide for proper collection of VAT to ensure that all legislative and administrative 
measures within its territory are appropriate. Hence, the processes brought against 
Åkerberg Fransson were related to falsified information in his VAT returns, therefore the 
question referred by the national court involved the interpretation of EU law and, 
subsequently, falls in the competence of the CoJ.
66
 
The CoJ reasoned that the CFREU does not preclude the Member States from imposing, for 
the same acts of non-compliance with declaration obligations in the field of VAT, a 
combination of tax penalties and criminal penalties. Nevertheless, Article 50 of the CFREU 
precludes the Member States from bringing repeated criminal proceedings against an 
individual in respect of the same conduct. Before it can be concluded whether the action 
brought against an individual breaches the principle of ne bis in idem, it is necessary for the 
                                                          
65 Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, paras, 12, 13. 
66 Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, paras, 17, 25 - 30. 
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national court to provide three criteria for this purpose: the first is the legal classification of 
the offence under national law, the second one is the nature of the offence, and the third one is 
the nature and degree of severity of the penalty.
67
 
Furthermore, the CoJ argued that if the domestic law norms are in conflict with the rights 
guaranteed by the CFREU, national courts are obliged to apply provisions of EU law and give 
full effect of those provisions. In situations where it is necessary, national courts are obliged 
to exercise their jurisdiction in such a way that a national court on its own motion should 
refuse to apply any conflicting national legislation. CoJ indirectly referred to the principle of 
effectiveness and reasoned that any provision of domestic law or any administrative or 
judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of EU law should be set aside. Last, but 
not least, it is important to note that the CoJ concluded that the ECMR does not constitute a 
legal instrument formally incorporated in EU law and, therefore, is not applicable until the EU 
has not acceded to ECMR.
68
 
Interim conclusions 
It can be concluded that domestic administrative procedural law can be regarded as 
incompatible with EU law if it does not comply with the general principles common to EU 
law, especially the principles of effectiveness and equivalence as well as the principles of 
legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations. The judgement in Åkerberg 
Fransson has more far reaching consequences than the judgement in Marks & Spencer I. The 
protection of fundamental rights that derive from the CFREU today are in practice 
safeguarded by CoJ if such dispute in essence fulfils the condition by being related to EU law. 
The CoJ conclusions are not limited by the principles common to the EU, but additionally 
include interpretation of the domestic procedural law norms in the light of fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the CFREU. It follows that in the VAT sphere, prohibition to render EU law 
ineffective applies to the domestic administrative and judicial practise as well, if that domestic 
practice by nature renders EU law ineffective. 
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4. EVIDENCE AND THE ALLOCATION OF BURDEN OF PROOF IN VAT DISPUTES 
4.1. Background 
Detailed rules of evidence and rules which would divide the burden of proof between a 
taxable person and tax administration at the EU level do not exist. Article 178 (b) of the VAT 
Directive stipulates that for the purposes of deduction in respect of transactions carried out by 
a taxable person and treated as supply of the goods or services, the taxable person must 
comply with the formalities laid down by each Member State. The same procedural autonomy 
pursuant to Article 131 of the VAT Directive applies to transactions that are VAT exempt. It 
implies that the allocation of the burden of proof in VAT disputes is governed each Member 
State’s by procedural law norms separately. This means that Member States are free to design 
their own rules of evidence to the extent that they do not render EU law ineffective. 
Moreover, rules regarding evidence and the allocation of the burden of proof must comply 
with the general objective of the EU to combat VAT fraud. 
4.2. Evidence 
Despite the procedural autonomy of Member States some indications of what information can 
be regarded as evidence is to be found in the VAT Directive and Implementing Regulation. 
Taxable persons, before they can exercise the right of deduction pursuit to Article 178 (a) of 
the VAT Directive, must hold a properly drawn invoice. In respect of the importation of 
goods pursuit to Article 178 (e) of the VAT Directive, a taxable person must hold an import 
document specifying him as a consignee or importer. Consequently, it can be concluded that 
invoices and import documents can be regarded as necessary evidence, before the right to 
deduct can be exercised. Aiming to ensure proper functioning of the VAT system, chapters 5 
and 6 of the VAT Directive obliges a taxable person to submit a VAT return and 
recapitulative statements stating relevant information which is necessary to calculate the 
amount of VAT to be paid VAT. Therefore, it allows the conclusion that information 
provided by the taxable person in his/her VAT return and recapitulative statement can be 
regarded as evidence if it is consistent with an invoice.
69
 Moreover, it can be concluded that 
the VAT Directive sets ground requirements for evidence which a taxable person is obliged to 
provide before the right of deduction can be exercised. 
In addition to the VAT Directive, the Implementing Regulation contains several rules of 
evidence applied in specific circumstances. Pursuant to Article 39 of the Implementing 
Regulation for the purpose of determining the place of supply for short-term hiring of means 
of transport a contract between the parties involved can serve as evidence. Moreover, Article 
51 of the Implementing Regulation stipulates that for the application of the exemption 
stipulated in Article 151 of the VAT Directive an exemption certificate set out in Annex II of 
the Implementing Regulation serves as evidence. Article 18 (3) (a) of the Implementing 
Regulation stipulates that a certificate, which is issued by a competent tax authority which 
validates that the acquirer of services established outside the EU has the capacity of a taxable 
person, serves as evidence. This certificate must state that acquirer of the services is engaged 
in economic activity. 
                                                          
69 It is important to recognize that departure from the formal requirements of the invoice is accepted and the right of deduction 
can be exercised in the scenario when the taxable person, before the tax authority has made its decision, has submitted a 
corrected invoice to the tax authority and provided the relevant evidence about occurrence, nature and amount of the transactions 
concerned. See Case C-271/12, Petroma Transports and Others, para 34. 
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On the 18
th
 December 2012, the Commission proposed to amend the Implementing 
Regulation as far as it regards the place of supply of services,
70
 by introducing rules of 
evidence for the identification of customer location related to short-term hiring of transport 
and electronically supplied services.
71
  
For the purpose of identifying where the customer is established or has his permanent address 
or usually resides, at least two separate pieces of evidence, which are not contrary to each 
other, have to be provided.
72
 Therefore, it allows the conclusion that it is possible that more 
precise rules regarding evidence on the common system of VAT will be introduced in the 
Implementing Regulation in future. 
Therefore it can be concluded that the VAT Directive stipulates indications that imply which 
information can be regarded as evidence in VAT disputes. The Implementing Regulation 
contains a minor amount of rules which are devoted to evidence. In overall Member States 
have a wide discretion to lay down domestic rules of evidence and exercise their national 
administrative practice in the VAT sphere. 
4.2.1. CoJ case law and evidence 
It is clear that in the VAT field some rules related to evidence are included in EU law. 
Nevertheless, due to the procedural autonomy of each Member state and the lack of scrutiny 
of the rules of evidence at the level of EU law, the rules of evidence are different across the 
Member States. Consequently, it is an obligation of a national court to carry out verification 
of evidence and access all relevant facts and circumstances in VAT disputes according to 
rules of evidence in national law.
73
 In the absence of rules of evidence in domestic law 
general practice established must be taken in to account.
74
 In VAT disputes all of the 
intentions of the taxable person must be supported by objective evidence.
75
 Despite of the 
significant role of evidence in VAT disputes, the CoJ case law does not indicate which 
evidence taken together can be regarded as objective evidence. Nevertheless, occasionally the 
CoJ has indicated which evidence cannot be regarded as decisive evidence. For example, 
when a taxable person carries out intra-Community supply of goods, the VAT return 
submitted by the person who acquired goods declaring intra-Community acquisition of the 
goods cannot be regarded as decisive evidence for the fact that the goods concerned have left 
the territory of the Member State where transportation of the respective goods had begun
76
 
(see section 4.3.3.1). Additionally, the fact that a business partner’s VAT identification 
number was removed from the VAT register retroactively (after the supply was carried out) 
cannot serve as decisive evidence
77
 (see section 4.3.3.2). Consequently, it can be concluded 
that the concept of objective evidence differs depending on the national practise of each 
Member State and from the subject of each dispute. It is equally important to acknowledge 
                                                          
70 Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 regarding the place of 
supply of services. 2012. COM (2012) 763 final, p.15. 
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that national rules of evidence must be enforced in such a manner that the effectiveness of EU 
law is not undermined
78
 and other general principles of EU are taken into account.
 79
 
4.2.1.1. Case C- 587/10 VSTR 
The dispute in VSTR involved refusal to exempt intra-Community supply of the goods
80
 on 
the grounds that taxable person could not provide the VAT number of the person acquiring 
the goods.  
A branch of VSTR established in Germany in November 1998 sold two stone-crushing 
machines to Atlantic International Trading Co (hereinafter Atlantic) established in the United 
States. VSTR requested Atlantic to provide its VAT identification number. Atlantic did not 
have a VAT number, but instead it informed VSTR that the goods were to be resold to a 
company established in Finland and gave the VAT identification number of the company 
registered in Finland. The goods where collected from Germany with transport contracted by 
a branch of Atlantic established in Portugal. The goods further were transported to Finland. 
The customer in Finland declared the intra-Community acquisition of the goods. In the end 
the goods were subject to tax in the country where the transportation of goods ended.
81
 
The tax authorities in Germany argued that the supply between the branch of VSTR and 
Atlantic could not be exempt from intra-Community supply of the goods, since Atlantic was 
not identified for VAT purposes in the EU, and therefore did not provide VSTR with its VAT 
number.
82
 VSTR contested the tax administration decision. The court of first instance 
dismissed the VSTR appeal, and consequently VSTR appealed the decision arguing that the 
decision is contrary to the Sixth Directive, since the exemption granted for intra-Community 
is rendered conditional on the formal obligation to provide the VAT identification number of 
the person who acquired the goods.
83
 
The referring court asked the CoJ two preliminary questions. The first question was: does the 
Sixth directive allow accepting intra-Community supply of the goods as VAT exempt if the 
taxable person is in capacity to furnish proof that the person acquiring the goods has a VAT 
identification number? The second question was related to the first question and in essence 
the court asked does the fact that the person acquiring the goods had its seat outside the EU 
and was not registered for VAT purposes in any Member state bear any significance in the 
dispute, and whether it is relevant that taxable person has proved that the person who 
ultimately acquired the goods submitted a tax return stating intra-Community acquisition, 
therefor having a valid VAT identification number.
84
 
Regarding the VAT identification number the CoJ reasoned that the first subparagraph of 
Article 28c (A) (a) of the Sixth Directive (now Article 138 (1) of the VAT Directive) 
stipulates that the person acquiring the goods must be a taxable person acting as such in 
another Member State. This means that the person which acquires the goods must not 
necessarily trade under a VAT identification number. Regardless of the fact, the VAT 
identification number provides proof of the tax status of the taxable person, but it is only a 
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formal requirement which cannot undermine the right of exemption when the substantive 
requirements for intra community-supply of the goods are fulfilled.
85
 
The CoJ argued that it is up to the supplier which performs intra-Community supply of the 
goods to furnish evidence that all substantive requirements for exempt intra-Community 
supply of the goods are met. Nevertheless, the national provisions that ensure the correct 
collection of the VAT aiming to combat VAT fraud must comply with the general principles 
of EU law and not go further than necessary to attain this objective.
86
  
The CoJ concluded that compliance with formal obligation without taking into account the 
substantive requirements goes further than necessary to ensure correct collection of VAT, and 
the principle of fiscal neutrality precludes such action in situations where a taxable person is 
not intentionally participating in tax evasion. The court stated that, despite the fact that 
Atlantic did not complete any VAT returns in the EU, the fact by itself cannot be constituted 
as decisive evidence, but it can only be regarded as an indication. Moreover, the fact that the 
person who acquired the goods is established in a third country does not bear significance. In 
a scenario where a supplier acts in good faith, has taken all the measures which can 
reasonably be required of him, is able to prove that substantive requirements for exemption 
are fulfilled and the goods are subject to tax in the country of destination, then the principle of 
fiscal neutrality precludes administrative practises by which the exemption is rendered 
conditionally on the basis that the supplier does not provide VAT identification number.
87
 
Interim conclusions  
The VSTR case makes it is clear that tax authorities and national courts are obliged to put 
aside formal obligations of domestic legislation as related to evidence if, on the basis of other 
objective evidence, it can be concluded that transactions concerned are not related to tax 
fraud, and all the substantive requirements are fulfilled to exempt intra-Community supply of 
the goods. 
Compellingly the CoJ case law clarifies some limitations regarding the procedural autonomy 
right of Member States to lay down procedural rules of evidence.  This autonomy is limited in 
such an extent that domestic provisions must comply with the general principles of the EU.  
4.3. Burden of proof 
EU VAT law does not contain rules which precisely govern how the burden of proof must be 
allocated in VAT disputes. Nevertheless, some rules indirectly indicate how the burden of 
proof in VAT disputes must be done. For example, Article 242 of the VAT Directive requires 
that all taxable persons must keep their VAT related bookkeeping accounts in sufficient detail 
and ensure that tax authorities can check them. Moreover, Article 244 of the VAT directive 
obliges a taxable person to store copies of all invoices which he has received, are issued by 
him, or are issued in his name or behalf of him. Articles 245 and 245 of the VAT Directive 
empowers tax authorities to request that taxable persons, without undue delay, provide 
available invoices which they stored due to obligations set in Article 244 of the VAT 
Directive. (See section 4.3.2.2). 
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86 Case C - 587/10, VSTR, paras 43, 44, 47,51. 
87 Case C - 587/10, VSTR, paras 45, 46, 54, 56-58. 
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Consequently, it allows, prima facie the conclusion that, due to the fact that tax authorities are 
empowered to check the authenticity of information provided by the taxable person, the 
obligation to prove if information on invoices and taxable person submitted VAT return is 
inconsistent or false lies with the tax authority. 
In the field of VAT exchange of information between Member States is governed by the 
Council Regulation (EU) No. 904/2010 of 7 October 2010 on administrative cooperation and 
combating fraud in the field of value added tax.
88
 This regulation supplements Regulation 
(EC) No.1798/2003
89
 adding provisions to more effectively combat cross-border VAT 
fraud.
90
 Mentioned Regulations sets the conditions under which Member states are obliged to 
cooperate with each other to ensure proper collection of VAT.
91
 These Regulations on 
administrative cooperation does not contain any rules regarding burden of proof and neither 
does they grant any rights to taxable persons, except that a taxable person has rights to acquire 
information about other taxable persons’ VAT identification numbers (see section 4.3.3.1.). 
Nevertheless, these regulations provide extensive powers to Member States to share and 
acquire relevant information from each other to ensure proper collection of VAT.  Therefore 
in situations where a taxable person has excessive difficulties to acquire relevant information 
from its business partner located in another Member state the tax administration could 
exercise its powers and acquire relevant information. 
The Implementing Regulation for certain transactions is more precise when the question of 
how the allocation of the burden of proof is done arises
92
 Article 3 of the Implementing 
Regulation sets a general obligation for the supplier to demonstrate that the place of supply of 
the services stipulated in the first subparagraph of Article 56 (2),
93
 and Articles 58
94
 and 59
95
 
of the VAT Directive is located outside the EU. Moreover Articles18(1) (b),
96
20 and 23
97
of 
the Implementing Regulation sets an obligation for the supplier to carry out a reasonable level 
of verification of the accuracy of the information provided by the customer with the goal to 
                                                          
88 Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 of 7 October 2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of 
value added tax. OJ L 268, 12.10.2010. 
89 Council Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003 of 7 October 2003 on administrative cooperation in the field of value added tax and 
repealing Regulation (EEC) No 218/92. OJ L 264, 15.10.2003. 
90 B.Terra and P.Wattel, p. 436. 
91 Council Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003, Articles 1, 57. 
92 Section 4 of the Implementing regulation contains rules which sets conditions which must be taken into account for the purpose 
to determine the place of supply for services rendered in accordance to Articles 43 to 59 of the VAT Directive. 
93 Article 56 (2) of the VAT Directive refers to hiring, other than short-term hiring, of  means of transport to a non-taxable 
person. 
94 Article 3 (b) of the Implementing Regulation pursuits the obligation set for the supplier to demonstrate that the place of supply 
for the services which is stipulated in Article 58 of the VAT Directive is outside the EU, it will become applicable on 1th January 
2015. The future Article 58 of the VAT Directive refers to telecommunication services, radio and television broadcasting 
services and electronically supplied services listed in Annex II of the VAT Directive. 
95 Article 59 of the VAT Directive refers to following services; transfers and assignments of copyrights, patents, licences, trade 
marks and similar rights; advertising services; the services of consultants, engineers, consultancy firms, lawyers, accountants and 
other similar services, as well as data processing and the provision of information;  obligations to refrain from pursuing or 
exercising, in whole or in part, a business activity or a right referred to in this Article; banking, financial and insurance 
transactions including reinsurance, with the exception of the hire of safes; he supply of staff; the hiring out of movable tangible 
property, with the exception of all means of transport; the provision of access to a natural gas system situated within the territory 
of the Community or to any network connected to such a system, to the electricity system or to heating or cooling networks, or 
the transmission or distribution through these systems or networks, and the provision of other services directly linked thereto; 
telecommunications services; radio and television broadcasting services; electronically supplied services. 
96 Article 18 of Implementing Regulation sets requirements which must be met before the customer established within the 
Community can be regarded as taxable person in situation where he has not yet received an individual VAT identification 
number. 
97 Article 20 of the Implementing Regulation sets the conditions which have to be taken into account by the supplier of services if 
the supply of services falls within the scope of Article 44, and consequently is taxed outside the Member State, where the 
supplier of the services is established. Similarly Article 23 of the Implementing Regulation refers to services stipulated  in 
Articles 56 (2), 58 and 59 of the VAT Directive and sets the requirement to collect information before the supply of services can 
be taxed at the place where acquirer of the services is established  or, in the absence of an establishment, the location of his 
permanent address or the place where he usually resides.  
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determine the place of supply for the services provided. Additionally Article 22 of the 
Implementing Regulation sets an obligation for the supplier of the services to examine the 
nature and use of the service provided with the purpose to identify the place of the customers 
fixed establishment to whom the service is provided. 
Therefore it allows the conclusion that in these specific situations the Implementing 
Regulation sets obligations for the supplier of the services to collect evidence before they can 
exercise the right of deduction. This indicates that in a VAT dispute the initial burden to proof 
that the information submitted in the VAT return is borne by the taxable person.  
Despite the fact that some indirect indications related to evidence and the burden of proof can 
be found in the VAT Directive, it is clear that the VAT Directive specifies that Member States 
have procedural autonomy to lay down national rules of evidence and rules which state how 
the allocation of the burden of proof is done in VAT Disputes. Regardless of the procedural 
autonomy conferred to Member States in specific situations the Implementing Regulation 
directly deals with the allocation of the burden of proof and evidence in the VAT sphere.  
The Implementing Regulation is adopted according to Article 397 of the VAT Directive 
together with Article 291 (2) of the TFEU. These legal rules confer power to the Council to 
adopt measures which are necessary to implement the VAT Directive. The goal of the 
Implementing Regulation is to lay down rules which implement the VAT Directive. The 
second and fourth recitals and Article 1 of the Implementing Regulation stipulate that the 
legal rules included in the Implementing Regulation seek to ensure a unified interpretation of 
the VAT Directive law norms when divergences of the application of these norms have arisen 
or are about to arise across the EU. Consequently it allows the conclusion that the legality of 
the rules related to evidence and allocation of the burden of proof included in the 
Implementing Regulation can become questionable, since the VAT Directive pursuits to 
confer the right to lay down rules of evidence and the allocations of the burden of proof to the 
Member States. The Implementing Regulation widens the scope of the VAT Directive, since 
it limits the procedural autonomy of Member States to lay down procedural rules of evidence 
and rules regarding the allocation of the burden of proof conferred to them by the VAT 
Directive. 
4.3.1. Allocation of the burden of proof in Latvia 
The complexity of domestic procedural rules regarding the allocation of the burden of proof 
can be illustrated with the approach used in Latvia. Legal proceedings in the field of the 
taxation in Latvia are regulated by Administrative Procedure Law.
98
 In addition to the 
Administrative Procedure Law, some of the procedural law norms are included in the Law on 
Taxes and Fees.
99
  The Law on Taxes and Fees is regarded as a law which designates the tax 
and fee system in Latvia. The Law on Taxes and Fees regulates the collection and recovery of 
taxes, the liability of the taxable persons and tax authority. Additionally, it contains rules 
which regulate the appeal procedures for decisions made regarding tax and fee issues. The 
Administrative Procedure Law and the Law on Taxes and Fees define the functions, rights 
and obligations of the tax authority and the taxable person. 
The Administrative Procedure Law sets the role of the obligations related to the allocation of 
the burden of proof for both sides involved in tax disputes. Article 59 (4) Administrative 
                                                          
98 Administrative Procedure Law, Republic of Latvia. (Administratīvā procesa likums) 25.10.2001. Ziņotājs, Nr.23, 13.12.2001.  
99 Law on Taxes and Fees, Republic of Latvia. (Likums par Nodokļiem un nodevām). 02.02.1995.  Ziņotājs, Nr.7, 13.04.1995. 
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Procedure Law stipulates that a taxable person is obligated to provide evidence or inform the 
tax administration about facts which are at its disposal that are important in the case. 
Nevertheless, the main obligation to acquire information lies on the tax administration.
100
 The 
Tax authority is obligated to set out evidence upon which the conclusions of the tax 
administration are based and the grounds on which basis the evidence provided by the taxable 
person has been rejected. The Tax Authority is allowed to base their decision on the grounds 
of the Constitution, laws, Cabinet Regulations or binding regulations of local governments, 
norms of international law or EU law and general principles of law. The Tax Authority can 
use arguments, which have been expressed in court judgments and legal literature as well as 
other special literature.
101
 
After the tax authority’s decision is finalised the tax authority is forbidden from providing 
additional evidence that is not mentioned in the case beforehand. Judges who hear tax 
disputes in administrative procedure are obligated to determine the true facts in the case on 
their own motion. They are empowered with the right to collect evidence on their own 
initiative. The right to collect evidence on one’s own motion is based on the principle of 
objective investigation. Regardless of the fact that Administrative courts are bound by the 
principle of objective investigation, the taxable person has an active role in the litigation 
process as well, he is obligated to participate in collecting evidence according to his 
capacity.
102
 
Article 38 of the Law on Taxes and Fees stipulates that if a taxable person does not agree with 
the amount of the tax payments assessed by the tax authority, evidence regarding the amount 
of the tax payment shall be provided by the taxable person. This legal norm is in conflict with 
the Administrative Procedure Law. The rules Administrative Procedure Law may be violated 
in cases where the evidence provided by the administration in its decisions is not sufficient, 
and the conclusions of the tax authority are based on assumption but not on the basis of 
objective facts. In such a situation, the taxable person can be obliged to provide sufficient 
evidence by himself to disprove the tax administration’s decision, since Article 38 of Law on 
Taxes and Fees is regarded as lex specialis in all tax related disputes.  
The Administrative Court adjudicating the tax disputes often refers to Article 38 of the Law 
on Taxes and Fees. Since the litigation process in VAT disputes almost always touches upon 
the question of distribution of the burden of proof between the parties, a large number of 
judgements from the Supreme Court are available. The main idea behind the rulings of the 
Supreme Court is that in situations where the taxable person does not agree with the 
conclusions of the tax administrations, then, in the light of Article 38 of the Law on Taxes and 
Fees, the burden of proof is shifted to taxable person.
103
 The Supreme Court interprets Article 
38 of the Law on Taxes and Fees in such a way that the taxable person should have the 
capacity to disprove the evidence provided by the tax administration in order to safeguard the 
right to deduct input tax paid.
104
   
 
 
                                                          
100 Administrative Procedure Law, Republic of Latvia, Article 59 (1) (2). 
101 Administrative Procedure Law, Republic of Latvia, Articles 67(3) (4). (5). 
102 Administrative Procedure Law, Republic of Latvia, Articles 107 (4) and 150 (3). 
103 Case SKA–166/2010, 15.03.2010. Supreme Court, Republic of Latvia, para 9. 
104 Case SKA-53/2007, 21.02.2010. Supreme Court, Republic of Latvia, para 6.2.2. 
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Interim conclusions 
Therefore it allows the conclusion that in Latvia the burden of proof in VAT disputes is 
initially allocated to the tax administration, but after the final tax administration’s decision the 
tax liability increases which shifts the burden of proof to the taxable person.   
4.3.2. Allocation of the burden of proof in other EU Member States 
In Austria the tax authority generally bears the burden of proof. The tax authority is required 
to investigate all relevant facts in order to levy taxes. On the other hand, the taxable person 
has an obligation, on request of tax authority, to cooperate and to provide all necessary facts 
and to dispel doubts which could lead to tax liability.
105
 In Belgium the burden of proof is 
allocated to the party which invokes facts. Therefore, the tax authority bears the burden to 
conclude that the information provided by the taxable person is incorrect. Nevertheless, the 
burden of proof in Belgium can be shifted to the taxable person if it does not comply with the 
obligation to cooperate with the tax administration.
106
 Also in Finland, tax authorities 
generally bear the burden of proof related to facts which constitutes the basis for the tax 
claim, and, from other side, the taxable person bears the burden of proof to show 
circumstance alleviating or eliminating tax claims. This approach is governed by the principle 
that the burden of proof rests with the party with the easiest access to the information 
concerned.
107
 A similar approach is exercised in Spain. Moreover, in the Spain the burden of 
proof is allocated by the principle that the party which wishes to make a claim must prove 
underlying facts. Nevertheless in disputes involving abuse of law, the burden of proof can be 
shifted to the taxable person.
108
 In France, as well as in Belgium, the burden of proof can be 
used as a penalty if the taxable person does not comply with its obligations, in such situations 
the burden of proof is shifted to the taxable person. In France the burden of proof lies with the 
party with the easiest access to the relevant information.
109
 Similar to the situation in Latvia, 
in Portugal courts hearing tax disputes are obliged to investigate all the facts in the case on 
their own motion. In Portugal, in VAT related disputes where the right of deduction is called 
into question, the burden of proof is shifted to the taxable person.
110
 
Interim conclusions 
The examples of the allocation of the burden of proof in Belgium, Finland, Spain, France and 
Portugal do not include all relevant aspects of the domestic approaches exercised, but 
nevertheless they suggest that a number of different methods are exercised across the EU. 
Therefore it can be concluded that, due to the procedural autonomy of each Member State to 
design their own procedural rules, the burden of proof rules across the EU differ.  
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4.3.3. CoJ case law and allocation of the burden of proof 
Despite of some indications this thesis made clear that EU VAT law does not contain rules 
which precisely govern how the burden of proof must be allocated in VAT disputes. 
Moreover allocation of the burden of proof falls within the procedural autonomy of each 
Member state. Nevertheless CoJ case law indicates how burden of proof allocations must be 
done in VAT disputes.  
4.3.3.1. Case C-184/05 – Twoh International 
In the case Twoh International CoJ dealt with the question of the allocation of the burden of 
proof and the obligation of the tax authorities to gather evidence on the basis of administrative 
cooperation between tax administrations in the area of VAT. Therefore, the judgement in the 
Twoh International case is directly related to the question how the burden of proof should be 
allocated in VAT disputes. The case involved interpreting the grounds for applying the 
authority conferred on tax administration by the Mutual assistance directive
111
 and the 
Administrative cooperation regulation.
112
 Despite the fact that both legislative acts have been 
replaced by now with new ones, the acknowledgments from the judgment in Twoh 
International case are relevant, since the aims for cooperation between Member States remain 
the same and are not affected by the new legislative acts. 
 
The relevant facts in this case are that the company established in the Netherlands, Twoh 
International (hereinafter Twoh) supplied computer parts to companies established in Italy. 
The parties used the “ex works” delivery method.113 Subsequently, Twoh was required to 
place goods at the disposal of the buyer at a warehouse which was located in the Netherlands. 
Transportation of the goods to Italy was the responsibility of the buyers. Twoh did not receive 
from the companies (established in Italy) proof that they declared intra-Community 
acquisition of the goods. Subsequently, Twoh did not fulfil the obligation required by 
Netherland’s tax law that a supplier is obligated to prove that the supply of goods was intra-
Community by nature.
114 
The tax administration took the view that Twoh did not demonstrate that the goods had been 
dispatched or transported to another state. As a result, the tax administration calculated an 
additional VAT payment for Twoh. Twoh disagreed with that decision and on the basis of the 
Mutual assistance directive and the Administrative cooperation directive requested that the 
tax administration gather information from the competent Italian authority to demonstrate that 
the buyers had declared the intra-Community acquisition of the goods in Italy.
115
 
The national court considered that the dispute involves interpretation of EU law and, 
therefore, referred the preliminary question to the CoJ. In essence the court asked whether the 
first subparagraph of Article 28c(A)(a) of the Sixth Directive (now Article 138 (1) of the 
VAT Directive), in conjunction with the Mutual assistance directive and the Administrative 
cooperation regulation have be interpreted in a way that, upon request of the taxable person, 
                                                          
111 Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the 
Member States in the field of direct and indirect taxation, OJ L 336, 27.12.1977, now replaced with Council Directive 
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114 Case C-184/05, Twoh International, paras 15, 16. 
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the tax authorities of the Netherlands are obligated to seek information from the competent 
authorities in Italy with an aim to use that information to establish whether the goods had in 
fact been the subject of an intra-Community supply and acquisition of the goods.
116 
The CoJ reasoned that the tax administration on the basis of evidence provided by the taxable 
persons and from their statements is obligated to check whether or not goods have left the 
territory of the Member state where the transportation or dispatch of the goods began. CoJ 
reasoned that the Sixth Directive does not contain provision which deals directly with the 
question regarding what information can serve as objective evidence, since the first part of the 
sentence in Article 28c (A) of the Sixth Directive (now Article 131 of the VAT Directive) 
stipulates that it is for Member States to determine the condition under which they will 
exempt intra-Community supply of the goods. Nevertheless, the domestic provision must 
comply with the general principles of EU law, especially with the principles of the 
proportionality and legal certainty. CoJ ruled that when a taxable person seeks derogation or 
exemption from VAT the burden of providing the necessary proof lies on the taxable 
person.
117
 
The CoJ held that the legal measures that derive from the Mutual assistance directive and the 
Administrative cooperation regulation do not confer any rights to individuals other than in 
obtaining information regarding the validity of the VAT registration number of any specified 
person. The Mutual assistance directive and the Administrative cooperation regulation do not 
serve to establish the intra-Community nature of goods, in situations when a taxable person 
by him or herself is not able to furnish the necessary evidence. Tax administration authority is 
unrestricted in requesting from a taxable person himself to furnish the proof necessary, and is 
not obliged to perform enquiries on the basis of the request of the taxable person.
118
 
Last but not least, the CoJ indicated that even if the tax administration of the Netherlands 
were to request information from a competent authority of Italy and subsequently received 
confirmation that the buyer had submitted the declaration to the Italian tax authorities 
confirming intra-Community acquisition of goods, such information by itself cannot serve as 
decisive evidence capable of establishing that the goods actually left the territory of the 
Member State where the dispatch or transportation of the goods began.
119
 
Interim conclusions 
In Twoh International case the CoJ reasoning makes it clear that in VAT disputes when 
transactions involved are subject to exemptions or derogations from the overall VAT system, 
the burden of proof lies on the taxable person. In Twoh International the burden of proof was 
allocated to the taxable person because he wanted to benefit from the exemption with the right 
of deduction provided for intra-Community supply of the goods. The tax administration is not 
bound by the taxable person’s request to perform additional enquiries for the benefit of the 
taxable person. The Directive 2011/16 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation 
and Regulation 904/2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of 
VAT do not provide rights for individuals receive information except the information 
regarding the validity of the VAT registration number of any specified person. 
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Therefore, from the Twoh International judgement the question arises whether the 
conclusions from this case concerning the allocation of proof can be applied when a taxable 
person performs economic activities purely in a domestic market which is not related to 
derogations or exemptions from the overall VAT system. Particularly, the facts in this case 
concern intra-Community supply of goods, the CoJ, in the paragraph 26 of the Twoh 
International, explicitly emphasised that a person who seeks tax treatment which is based on 
the derogation and exemption from the overall VAT system is obligated to prove that all 
necessary conditions are fulfilled. Therefore, it allows the conclusion that CoJ reasoning, 
given in this judgement, is limited to only situations where transactions involve derogations or 
exemptions.  
Equally important is to ascertain that the CoJ acknowledges that the VAT Directive does not 
contain any rules of evidence related to the intra-Community supply of goods. The CoJ 
conclusions regarding domestic rules of evidence define that domestic rules of evidence must 
comply with general principles of EU law. Similarly the VAT Directive does not contain any 
rules of how the burden of proof must be handled in VAT disputes related to intra-
Community supply of goods. This fact did not restrict the CoJ to rule that the burden of proof 
lies within taxable persons who seek to benefit from it when derogations or exemptions of the 
overall VAT system is involved. Moreover this conclusion is not based on any EU VAT rules 
or the general principles of EU law, and consequently undermines the effectiveness of Article 
131 of the VAT Directive which confers procedural autonomy to Member States to lay down 
inter alia rules of allocation of the burden of proof.   
4.3.3.2. Case C-273/11, Mecsek-Gabona 
Mecsek-Gabona, a company established under Hungarian law, concluded a contract with 
Agro-Trade srl (hereinafter Agro), company established in Italy.  Mecsek-Gabona sold to 
Agro 1 000 tons of rapeseed. Agro undertook to transport the goods to another Member State. 
The goods were picked up and weighted at Mecsek-Gabona premises. Afterwards the 
quantities of the goods sold where recorded on CMRs.
120
 Originals of the CMRs remained 
with the carriers. The serial numbers of the CMRs were returned to Mecsek-Gabona by post 
from the purchaser’s address in Italy. Two invoices were issued, the first invoice was paid by 
a Hungarian private person, and the second invoice wasn’t paid at all. Mecsek-Gabona 
verified that Agro had a VAT identification number.
121
  
Hungarian tax authorities, in the course of checking Mecsek-Gabona tax returns, requested 
information from the Italian tax authorities. Italian tax authorities informed that Agro could 
not be found at the registered address and that no company with that name had been registered 
at that address, which was a private residence. Additionally, Agro never paid VAT and its 
VAT identification number was removed from the register with retroactive effect. On the 
basis of this information the Hungarian tax authorities concluded that Mecsek-Gabona has 
failed to furnish evidence that transaction at question was an intra-Community supply of 
goods.
 122
  
Mecsek-Gabona appealed to the court and argued that tax authority’s decision must be 
annulled since Mecsek-Gabona had acted with due diligence, checked the validity of 
                                                          
120 Consignment notes drawn up in accordance with the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by 
Road, signed in Geneva on 19 May 1956. 
121 Case C-273/11, Mecsek-Gabona, paras 15-19. 
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purchaser’s VAT identification number and received CMRs from the purchaser’s address in 
Italy. Moreover, Mecsek-Gabona argued that they could not have had any knowledge of the 
fact that the Italian tax authority had removed Agro identification number from its VAT 
register with retroactive effect. Italy’s national court considered that an interpretation of 
Article 138 of the VAT Directive is necessary and therefore referred three preliminary 
questions to the CoJ. The first and second question inquires if Article 138 of the VAT 
Directive precludes to refuse an exemption with right to deduct input VAT situation when: 
- the right to dispose goods as owner passes to the purchaser in the Member state 
where the vendor is established, while the purchaser is established in another 
Member state and at the time of the transaction had a valid VAT registration 
number, and the purchaser undertook the responsibility to transport the goods to 
another Member state; 
- the vendor furnishes evidence in the form of CMRs and confirms that the goods 
sold have been picked up by foreign-registered vehicles.  
With the third question the national court asked if the vendor may be refused VAT exemption 
for intra-Community supply of goods on the grounds that the tax authority of another Member 
State has removed the purchaser’s VAT identification number from the register with 
retroactive effect.
 123
   
 
CoJ argued that it is the responsibility of the vendor to provide evidence that the title of goods 
has been transferred and that the goods have been dispatched to another Member state. 
Identically like in Twoh International the CoJ concluded that if the mentioned conditions are 
not fulfilled, the right to deduct input VAT can be refused. However, CoJ emphasized that 
even if the taxable person has fulfilled the obligations concerning evidence, the right to 
deduct can be made conditional upon taxable person’s good faith. Consequently the right of 
deduction can be denied if on the basis of objective evidence it is established that the taxable 
person knew or should have known that the transaction, which it had carried out, was part of a 
tax fraud committed by the purchaser. Regarding the question if the evidence provided by 
Mecsek-Gabona can be sufficient to benefit from exemption the CoJ concluded that it falls 
outside competence sphere, since the VAT Directive does not contain rules about evidential 
proof.  CoJ stressed that the obligation set for a taxable person to furnish evidence must be 
determined in the light of national law and general practice established in respect of similar 
transactions. When national courts apply domestic rules they are obliged take in to account 
the general principles of EU law and in particularly, the principles of legal certainty and 
proportionality.
 124
   
 
Regarding the third question the CoJ concluded that it would be contrary to the principle of 
proportionality if the right to deduct input VAT would be dependent on the fact that the 
purchaser’s VAT identification number was removed from the register with retroactive 
effect.
125
   
 
Interim conclusions 
 
The CoJ conclusions in Mecsek-Gabona case summarise that in situations when the taxable 
person has furnished evidence to benefit from exemption granted for intra-Community supply 
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of goods these rights can be rendered conditional upon good faith. In order to deny the right to 
deduct the tax authority bears the burden of proof to provide evidence that the taxable person 
knew or should have known that the transaction, which it had carried out, was part of a tax 
fraud committed by the purchaser. 
4.3.3.3. Joined cases C-80/11 andC-142/11Mahagében and Dávid 
The joined cases Mahagében and Dávid are related to the interpretation of the domestic 
practise exercised to combat VAT avoidance and evasion pursuant to  Article 273 of the VAT 
Directive from the perspective of the allocation of the burden of proof. 
C-142/11 Dávid 
The relevant facts in the Dávid case were that Mr. Dávid undertook to carry out various 
construction works. However, Mr. Dávid did not carry out all construction work by himself, 
he used a subcontractor Mr. Máté. Mr. Dávid paid remuneration to Mr. Máté on the basis of 
the certificate of completion of the work. After tax inspection, the tax administration 
concluded that Mr. Máté did not have any employees or equipment to carry out the work with 
respect to the invoices that were issued to Mr. Dávid. Mr. Máté reissued invoices to his 
father-in-law who also did not have any employees. Moreover, his father-in-law did not fill 
out any tax returns at the tax year at issue. In the light of those circumstances, the tax 
authorities concluded that on the basis of invoices issued by the subcontractor it was not 
possible to establish that the economic transaction detailed in them had taken place. Though 
the tax authorities did not contest the fact that construction work was actually carried out, it 
was impossible, for VAT purposes, to ascertain which contractor carried them out. Because of 
those inconsistencies, the tax administration concluded that Mr.Dávid did not act with 
necessary due diligence. In addition to the mentioned construction work, Mr. Dávid had 
undertaken to carry out another construction work where he used a different subcontractor, 
which at the time of tax inspection was already in liquidation. Due to the liquidation of the 
subcontractor it was not possible to acquire relevant documents, because it was impossible to 
contact the former representative and the liquidator did not have possession of relevant 
information. Similar to the first situation, tax administration took the view that Mr. Dávid did 
not act with due diligence because he did not provide evidence which would have proven that 
the subcontractors had the resources necessary to carry out the construction work. On the 
basis of above mentioned facts tax administration refused Mr. Dávid the right of deduction 
and imposed a fine for late payment.
126
 
Mr. Dávid brought an action before the court and argued that he was satisfied with the 
construction work carried out by the subcontractors. Moreover he maintained that the 
economic activity indeed took place, and that he had checked the status of the invoice issuer 
and therefore he cannot be held liable for any irregularities on the part of the subcontractor in 
situations where it is not proven that he knew or should have known that he acted improperly.  
The national court was unsure whether Mr. Dávid had right to deduct, therefore it referred 
three preliminary questions to the CoJ. The first question asked whether the right of deduction 
can be refused on the basis of strict liability if the issuer of an invoice cannot guarantee that 
further subcontractors complied with their obligations. The second question, in essence, asked 
whether the right of deduction can be refused in situations where the tax authority does not 
dispute that the economic activity detailed in the invoices actually took place and the form of 
                                                          
126 Joined cases C-80/11 and C-142/11, Mahagében and Dávid, paras 24-29. 
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invoice complies with legal rules. The third question was related to the second question, the 
court asked whether the tax authorities are obliged to prove that a person who seeks to 
exercise his right of deduction was aware of unlawful conduct exercised by the issuer of the 
invoice or by the another taxable person upstream of the transaction chain.
127
 
The CoJ reasoned that there were no doubts that Mr. Dávid received supplies of services and 
that they were subsequently used as outputs for the purposes of his taxable transactions. The 
CoJ concluded that in this dispute all the substantive and formal conditions which derive from 
the VAT Directive were satisfied, and the order for reference did not indicate that Mr. Dávid 
acted unlawfully. The CoJ emphasized that the right to deduct can be refused on the basis of 
objective factors which would establish that Mr. Dávid knew, or ought to have known, that 
that transaction was connected with fraud previously committed by the supplier or another 
trader at an earlier stage in the transaction. Consequently, the establishment of a system of 
strict liability would go beyond what is necessary to preserve the public exchequer’s rights. 
Therefore, the CoJ concluded that Articles 167, 168(a), 178(a), 220(1) and 226 of the VAT 
Directive
128
 must be interpreted as precluding national practice when tax administration 
refuses the right to deduct on the grounds that the issuer of the invoices acted improperly 
without establishing that, on the basis of objective evidence, the fact that Mr. Dávid knew, or 
ought to have known, that the transaction relied on fraudulent ends.
129
 
Case C-80/11Mahagében 
Mahageben regularly bought acacia logs from the supplier Rómahegy-Kertkft (hereinafter 
Rómahegy). Pursuant to the supply of the goods concerned, Rómahegy issued 16 invoices. 
Rómahegy paid VAT and declared all the supplies in his tax return, stating that deliveries of 
the goods took place. Mahageben also declared acquisition of the goods and exercised its 
right to deduct. During the tax inspection of purchase and deliveries performed by Rómahegy, 
the tax administration concluded that Rómahegy did not have any reserves of the goods 
concerned and that the amount of goods purchased was insufficient to fill the orders invoiced 
to Mahagében. Consequently, on the basis of acquired facts, the tax administration concluded 
that Mahagében had no right of deduction with respect to those invoices issued by 
Rómahegy.130 
Mahagében contested the decision and brought an administrative appeal against the initial 
decision of the tax administration. The appeal was rejected on the grounds that Rómahegy did 
not have the quantity of goods indicated on the invoices. Additionally it did not have an 
appropriate lorry for delivery of the goods nor was any evidence provided which would 
indicate the price was paid for delivery of the goods. Moreover it was concluded that 
Mahageben did not act with due diligence since it did not check whether Rómahegy was a 
taxable person and whether it was in possession of the goods which Mahagében wished to 
purchase. Mahagében brought an action before the court and argued that it had acted with due 
diligence and that its role is limited to the obligation to verify that the supplying company had 
                                                          
127 Joined cases C-80/11 and C-142/11, Mahagében and Dávid, paras 30-33. 
128 Article 167 of the Directive stipulates that right to deduct arises at the time when the deductible tax becomes chargeable. 
According to Article 168 (a) taxable person is entitled to deduct VAT due or paid from the VAT, which he is liable to pay, if 
goods and services are used for taxable transactions. Article 178 of the VAT Directive governs that for the purposes of deduction 
taxable person must have a properly drawn invoice. Article 220 (1) of the VAT Directive sets an obligation for taxable person 
that an invoice is issued, and  Article 226 of the VAT Directive details what must be reflected on the invoice. 
129 Joined cases C-80/11 and C-142/11, Mahagében and Dávid, paras 43,44,45-50. 
130 Joined cases C-80/11 and C-142/11, Mahagében and Dávid, paras 15-18. 
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a VAT registration number and that it was capable of carrying out the transaction 
concerned.
131
 
The national court had doubts that the right to deduct VAT can be refused on the grounds that 
issuer of the invoice did not enter the goods into its bookkeeping accounts and that without 
the lorry it was unable to deliver the goods. Consequently, the national court referred a 
preliminary questions to the CoJ and in essence asked whether such administrative practise is 
proportional and compatible with Article 273 of the VAT Directive and whether the concept 
of due diligence is compatible with the principles of fiscal neutrality and proportionality. 
Additionally, the court asked whether Articles 167, 168(a), 178(a), 220(1) and 226 of the 
VAT Directive 
132
 preclude national legislation or practice which requires a taxable person 
receiving an invoice to verify compliance with the law by the supplier who issued the 
invoice.
133
 
The CoJ reasoning was similar to the reasoning in the Dávid case where it concluded that the 
right to deduct cannot be refused if taxable person had possession of the goods and a properly 
drawn invoice confirming that the goods were actually supplied from the supplier indicated 
on it. The supplies were subsequently used as outputs for the purposes of his taxable 
transactions. Similar to the Dávid case, the CoJ referred to the use of the knowledge test and 
concluded that it must be applied before the right to deduct can be refused. Additionally, the 
CoJ argued that it is not contrary to EU law to require a trader to act with due diligence to 
satisfy himself so that the transaction does not result in participation in tax evasion if there are 
indications of infringement or fraud. Nevertheless, measures of due diligence cannot lead to 
the situation where the right to deduct is systematically undermined, since it is contrary to the 
principle of fiscal neutrality of VAT. The CoJ argued that the powers conferred to Member 
States pursuant to Article 273 of the VAT Directive gives the domestic legal systems a 
margin of discretion when domestic law is designed to ensure correct levying and collection 
of VAT and to prevent its evasion. Nevertheless, national measures taken must not go further 
than is necessary to attain this objective.
134
 
It is equally important to acknowledge that the CoJ concluded that tax authorities must not set 
an obligation for a taxable person, that wishes to exercise its right of deduction, to establish 
that the issuer of the invoice has the capacity of taxable person, that he was in possession of 
the goods at issue and was capable to supply them, and that he has satisfied his obligations 
regarding the declaration and payment of VAT, to satisfy that there are no irregularities or 
fraud committed by the traders operating at an earlier stage of the transaction. The CoJ 
concluded that the tax authorities generally carry out the burden of proof and that, in 
principle, it is the task of the tax authorities to carry out the necessary inspections in order to 
detect VAT irregularities. Therefore, it is disproportional to ask a taxable person that wishes 
to exercise its right to deduct to carry out investigation tasks in place of the tax authority. The 
obligation to carry out the necessary inspections derives from Article 242 which sets a 
responsibility for the taxable person to keep accounts in sufficient detail, and from Articles 
245 and 249 of the VAT Directive which empowers the tax authority to check invoices which 
the taxable person has stored under Article 244 of the VAT Directive.
135
 (See section 4.3.) 
                                                          
131 Joined cases C-80/11 and C-142/11, Mahagében and Dávid,,paras 19,20. 
132 See Supra note 128. 
133 Joined cases C-80/11 and C-142/11, Mahagében and Dávid, paras 21,22. 
134 Joined cases C-80/11 and C-142/11, Mahagében and Dávid, paras 50. 51,52, 54,55,57, 60. 
135 Joined cases C-80/11 and C-142/11, Mahagében and Dávid, paras 61, 62,65,64 
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4.3.3.4. Case C-563/11 Forvards V 
In the Forvards V case, the national court asked the CoJ whether the right of deduction can be 
denied to a taxable person which did not carry out abusive practise and fulfilled all formal and 
substantial requirements necessary to exercise its right to deduct, in a situation where the 
supplier of the goods denies any existence of economic activity and had no capacity to supply 
the goods concerned.
136
 
The CoJ delivered a court order in Forvards V case and concluded that disputes which relate 
to the allocation of the burden of proof can be regarded as acte éclairé. The CoJ reasoning 
was similar to that of the Mahagében and Dávid cases. In addition to the conclusions given in 
the Mahagében and Dávid cases, the CoJ in the Forvards V case argued that the burden of 
proof lies with the tax authorities as well, in situations when irregularities are committed 
directly by the supplier and consequently the concerned supply is considered not to have 
actually taken place, therefore, considering it uncertain if the taxable person actually had 
received the goods or services from the supplier indicated in the invoice.
137
 
Interim conclusions 
The CoJ reasoning provided in the Mahagében and Dávid case becomes significant when the 
question of allocation of the burden of proof in VAT disputes arises. Consequently, the 
obligation to examine the intentions of the supplier and his compliance with the formal and 
substantive requirements of the VAT Directive and domestic procedural law cannot be 
transferred to a taxable person. It becomes clear that in situations when all formal and 
substantive requirements of the VAT Directive are fulfilled by the taxable person, the burden 
of proof is allocated to the tax authority. This means that taxable persons must be in 
possession of a properly drawn invoice and acquired goods or services that were subsequently 
used as outputs for the purposes of their taxable transactions. Moreover, the burden of proof is 
assigned to tax authority even in situations when, due to the irregularities in upstream 
transaction chains, tax authorities have doubts that taxable persons received the goods or 
services indicated by the taxable person in the invoices, consequently it is disputable that a 
transaction could actually have taken place. Before the right to deduct can be denied, tax 
authorities are obliged to apply the knowledge test, which in practice means that tax 
authorities carry out the burden to prove that a taxable person knew, or ought to have known 
that transactions carried out by the taxable person or other transaction upstream or 
downstream
138
 of the transaction chain are vitiated by fraud. From the court order delivered in 
the Forvards V case it can be concluded that the allocation of the burden of proof in VAT 
disputes that do not involve derogations or exemptions from the VAT system is regarded as 
acte éclairé. 
It is important to ascertain that the CoJ conclusions in the Mahagében and Dávid case do not 
limit the procedural autonomy of Member States to compel taxable persons which seek to 
exercise the right of deduction to prove and consequently furnish evidence that they were in 
possession of goods and services indicated in invoices and that the goods and services 
acquired are or will be subsequently used as taxable outputs when irregularities committed by 
these taxable person are noticed. 
                                                          
136 Case C-563/11, SIA Forvards V, para  21. 
137 Case C-563/11, SIA Forvards V,paras 23, 25,26, 35, 38,39,40,41. 
138 Case C-285/11, Bonik, para 40; 
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It is not contrary to EU law to require a taxable person to act with due diligence to satisfy 
himself so that the transaction does not result in participation in tax evasion if there are 
indications of infringement or fraud. Nevertheless, measures of due diligence cannot be lead 
to the situation when the right to deduct is systematically undermined. This means that 
taxable person can be obliged to act with additional precaution but can’t be forced to carry out 
checks of its business partner to ensure that the issuer of the invoice has the capacity of a 
taxable person, as well as that he was in possession of the traded goods and was capable to 
supply them and last but not least, that the business partner has fulfilled his obligation to 
declare the transaction and pay VAT. 
Additionally it can be concluded that the CoJ intention to safeguard the right to deduction 
jeopardises the Member States national practise domain when the burden of proof is allocated 
to the taxable person or when the method is applied that evidence must be provided by the 
party who has the easiest access to the information (See section 4.3.). The mentioned 
problematic of allocating the burden of proof in Member state national practice can arise in 
scenarios when the right of deduction is refused on the basis that the transaction chain is 
vitiated by VAT fraud or on the grounds of other irregularities committed by other taxable 
persons involved in that transaction chain. 
Compiling the analysed information in this section of this thesis allows the conclusion that 
procedural autonomy conferred to Member States to lay down rules which allocate the burden 
of proof is highly limited. The CoJ has clarified that in situations, where transactions related 
to derogations or exemptions from the overall VAT system, the burden of proof is allocated to 
the taxable person. In contrast if the taxable person has provided all necessary evidence, its 
rights can be rendered conditional on good faith, however in such situations the tax authority 
bears the burden of proof. At the same time, if transactions performed by the taxable person 
do not involve any derogations or exemptions from the general VAT system and the taxable 
person has fulfilled all substantive requirements to exercise the right of deduction, then in 
general, the burden of proof is allocated to the tax authorities. 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The principles common to the EU and specifically the principles of proportionality, 
effectiveness, equivalence, legal certainty and the protection of the legitimate expectations 
and the principle of fiscal neutrality play a pivotal role in ensuring proper functioning of the 
EU VAT system. On the basis of those principles, it is possible to render domestic 
administrative rules and practises incompatible with the EU VAT system. Moreover in VAT 
disputes, domestic administrative rules and practise must be set aside if they are in conflict 
with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the CFREU. Domestic rules and practises of the 
Member States must ensure the effectiveness of EU law. Member States are obliged to ensure 
that taxable persons can rely on the belief that they will receive VAT treatment as expected. 
Due to the general objective set for the EU and its Member States to combat VAT evasion 
and fraud, the legitimate expectations of taxable persons can be set aside if they intentionally 
participated in tax fraud, knew or should have known that transactions concerned are vitiated 
by tax fraud. Measures taken with the goal to achieve this objective must not go further than 
necessary to attain this objective and, consequently must be in conformity with the principle 
of proportionality. 
Despite of the fact that some rules related to evidence and allocation of the burden of proof 
can be found in EU VAT rules Member States still have a wide discretion to lay down their 
own rules of evidence. This procedural autonomy is limited in such an extent that domestic 
provisions must comply with the general principles of the EU. However, the procedural 
autonomy conferred to Member States to lay down rules which allocate the burden of proof is 
highly limited. The CoJ has clarified that in situations when transactions are related to 
derogations or exemptions from the overall VAT system, the burden of proof is allocated to 
the taxable person. In contrast if the taxable person has provided all necessary evidence, its 
rights can be rendered conditional on good faith. In such situations the tax authority bears the 
burden of proof. At the same time, if transactions performed by the taxable person do not 
involve any derogations or exemptions from the general VAT system and the taxable person 
has a properly drawn invoice and the acquired goods and services are used to carry out 
taxable transactions then the burden of proof is lies with the tax authorities. This method to 
allocate the burden of proof must be applied even in situations when, due to irregularities in 
the upstream or downstream transaction chain, the tax authorities are uncertain that the 
taxable person had possession of the goods or services indicated in the invoice. The 
interpretation of EU VAT rules given by the CoJ and EU VAT rules themself do not limit the 
procedural autonomy of Member States to compel taxable persons, which seek to exercise the 
right of deduction, to prove and consequently furnish evidence that they were in possession of 
goods and services indicated in the invoices and that the goods and services acquired are or 
will be subsequently used as taxable outputs when irregularities committed by these taxable 
person are noticed. Nevertheless, actions taken by the Member States must confer with the 
principles common to the EU. 
It is not contrary to EU law that national procedural rules set an obligation for a taxable 
person to act with due diligence before they carry out taxable transactions. Those rules must 
comply with the principles common to the EU, and cannot oblige taxable person to carry out 
investigational tasks which is in the tax authority’s field of competence.  
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